On Friday, more than a year after Terry Childs's arrest, the judge in the case threw out three of four charges against the former network admin for the City of San Francisco. The three dismissed charges were related to the modems that the prosecution claimed were clandestinely placed by Childs in order for him to control the network remotely. As I've been saying for the last year, these charges were simply ridiculous -- the modems used by Childs in this case were standard operating procedure for any network admin worth their salt. In fact, Childs would have been derelict in his duties if these modems weren't present. Finally, reason prevailed, and the charges pertaining to the modems were dismissed.
But one charge remains: the charge that Childs violated a California statute regarding illegal denial of service for the San Francisco FiberWAN. This is a sticky wicket. The statute was originally conceived and written to provide a legal platform to prosecute crackers who might bring down computing resources for the purposes of vandalism, profit, or other chicanery. The statute was meant to address a third party who knowingly disturbed and compromised the normal operating status of a computer system or network.
[ Read InfoWorld's jailhouse interview with Terry Childs. | Follow the Terry Childs saga in InfoWorld's special report: Terry Childs: Admin gone rogue. ]
The statute could address a cracker who organized a DDoS attack against a Web site or one that surreptitiously and illegally gained access to a server and crashed it, altered it, or otherwise interfered with the normal operation of that network or system. But can that statute apply to someone who was hired and paid by the government to build, maintain, and repair that network, especially given that no damage was done, no resources were denied to any employee, and the network suffered no downtime?
One could say that yes, Childs' refusal to divulge the passwords to his superiors was tantamount to a denial of service, for a narrow interpretation of "service," but the same argument might be made that Childs actually prevented a denial of service -- an illegal act -- by refusing to hand over those passwords.
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Download now »It may go away for us, but let's face it: Childs will be black-listed and probably for life. I wonder what kind of civil suit will be filed once the final charge is thrown out in court.
It is NOT the equivalent of giving someone the keys to the IT closet. Handing passwords over is the equivalent of permission to use. In the truck example, the manager had explicitly said that he/she intended to 'use' the truck. It will be interesting to see if the same standard is applied to the sheriff. Of course, the court must take into account that the sheriff has guns and a small army whereas the network administrator was simply a geek. Where was Homeland Security when the sheriff was on the rampage? Seems like it might be construed as 'home-grown terrorism'. Anyways, I also disagree that Childs will be black-listed. I have known many asshole quirky wizards whose technical expertise kept them employed even in down times.
The truck analogy is totally flawed. For it equates operation of a motor vehicle with that of network admnistration.
A more apt analogy would be should the captain of an airliner turn the operation of an airliner in mid-flight over to the head of the company just because he owns the plane?
Or should a surgeon allow the non-MD administrative head of the hospital perform brain surgery because of his rank?
If you agree to the latter, let us see you book yourself into SF General for brain surgery -- you need it... :)
It still seems to me that one thing read early on was that Childs wasn't just support tech he was the MAIN tech and partly the designer on that net work and was the only guy on call for that system so that's a lot for one guy in the city the size of SF and trust me I done some of the same on smaller scale but still anyone can see this guy was doing his job but for the pass word fiasco, Now early this year I had something of the same problem i was ask to set up server to small business but it was like we need it now and so i did what they asked adn gave them my list of need parts like a VPN Router adn Appiance fire wall adn a top of the line secuirty suite I got Blink in stall on the main 4 billing systems and the server and all was working well but the server was not fully on line till i got the hardware I wanted adn was said i was going to get .
They plan out to add 8 laptops to the mix for field work and they wanted them set up in a few hours i told them no that isn't how you send any laptop that will have personal client info on them or access and they agreed to let me set securing them. the next day I got note about the server not giving them access to the internet and told them I need more info but came in and look at the system after hours the system was fine an I could not see any problems but for still the need to get the hardware. The next day the Admin and CEO called asking for the passwords to add to the list as he was updating it. I saw no problem in this as he is the guy who owns the company and i did not think he would use them as he was not very computer savvy and I did think anything wrong with it ..Later that day I remote in as I did everyday to find Blink was gone from the Server.I was in shock the main protection was gone and one of the main billing systems was still showing attacks that night and we had showed him this. i called him and said the is problem and that Blink was gone and he said yes i de-installed it I was speechless I didn't scream till i got off the phone i said that is wrong you just don't open you self up why did he do this and he said because one program couldn't get online for doing billing ...WT!!! I said sir all you need to do was tell Blink to let go online .. he said I didn't know how .. I didn't even go in i just wrote it off as this was a medical billing and if anything was hacked I wasn't going to to go down for it we cancel the contract and that hurt at is a good 20K to 30K but I don't go to jail for some else being stupid. this why Childs didn't want to give the passwords that have no clue as to how the system runs and what is need to run it Childs did right in my eye and I hope sues till SF bleeds lets 14 month and he could bill how much an hour? oh that's going to hurt SF HARD! this last charge isn't going to hold as the system never went down and all the hard ware and account her had were normal and I can understand how he want to make sure people that didn't even know why modem would be hook to that system or why he had a pager to tell him a system need to be looked at I mean if these people were some who never have driven a car would you give them keys to drive off a city like SF?
these people want the passwords to a system that runs everything in SF and they had no clue as to what was need to make it run and it shows by not knowing why Childs had the right equipment set up to run thing from anywhere as he show be able to. I just tempted to just show up at the court to testify to this fact and I think ANY of those of us that are Tech's and in charge of Any large system needs to be there as well as what ever is the out come we will be effected as well and we need to make sure Childs Wins and get his day to sue their butts.
I would say "common sense" shows how we you're right, it's absurd a mechanic has to be licensed to work on a $1,500 used car (and my father was a mechanic). And in the IT world, I've seen little if any advantage to certified staff versus non-certified staff, as well as little real sense to requiring certification for most positions. But that just shows how common sense isn't the same for everyone.
However, in regard to public systems which have real impact on life and death functions and such, there is a solid notion here in requiring some form of certification or evidence of suitable skills/achievement for operators.
None of this justifies Child's actions, in a job sense, though. He may escape legal action as there is no applicable statute (I don't think the denial of service law should be misused in the fashion it seems to be here, just as I don't think RICO should have been misused beyond its intent despite its clear success in legal terms, laws should be used as intended, not stretched and distorted), but I'd think simple property laws would apply here, although as the state I would drop the charges for an absurd 14 months in jail - this absurdity is a common, serious problem with the legal system.
Mary Ann,
I am now confused. Thousands of people lost their jobs? homes? everything? Do you blame Terry Childs for the economic slump? What Terry Childs are you talking about. Most people here are aware of the particulars regarding the evidence "or lack there of" in this case. I would be willing to bet that more jobs were made then lost, since so far as I know only Terry Childs himself lost his job. I am sure they had to hire minimum 2 if not more people to do his job. Of course since the people that would be hired probably were worried about working somewhere that doesn't just fire you, but has you arrested, surely they negotiated top dollar at the taxpayers expense before taking the job.
As far as the exact timeline I would like to see an info graph on the events that took place, as far as I know though Terry gave up his passwords to the SF executive on his very first opportunity.
I see you don't understand the concept of secret information so try this out, when you are at the bank shout out your SSN#, account#, address, birthday, maiden name, and whatever other private information of yours to the teller. This will insure that some other bystanders hear and introduce you to the wonders of identity theft, of course this is only your private information that you will be giving up. But it will give you an idea at what was potentially at stake. Terry Childs network had thousands of peoples lives, their accounts, their jobs, their critically important data running on the network he was charged with safe guarding. You would have him turn this over to people who had no idea what to do with it? They needed his help just to enter the passwords.
Terry didn't cost thousands of peoples jobs or home, but his actions at a detriment to himself may have saved their jobs, homes, and lively hood.
Say hi to Gilligan for me.

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