5. Access points at other locations - If you de-centralize a system, you have to have the ability to manage the physical network inside each logical network. You need a way to get in and fix it.
6. He had an IDS that monitored the network. - Hell, I've got hundreds of IDS systems. And yes, one is set to look for other IDS systems that may be trying to probe the device at the core. Security doesn’t stop at the border. If you are decentralizing the process, you need to make sure that the admins of the resulting networks do not start playing with what is left of the central network. If they do, and make a mistake, it can affect everybody. Seen it happen to many times.
7. The request to keep bail mentions he accessed another network the day before he was fired. Funny how it didn’t point out that the investigator in the original filing said it was so he could perform 'requested maintenance' on a system at the Sherriff's Office.
8. He has password lists of other users. - I have them from when I originally generate a password for a new system. And I will admit, I even have a some of the problem users passwords so when they lock themselves out of a system each Monday I can get them back in.
9. He had diagrams and configs of the network at his house. - I'm sure if you dug through my stuff you would get a great lesson in the evolution of networking. When I design a complicated network, I am proud of it. I always keep copies. (plus I work to much and don’t clean out my home office very often)
10. Why are they making such a big deal about the pager? If I had an admin that didn’t have pager notification on the status of devices I would probably fire him. And he better have access from home. I'm not paying a 2 hour travel bonus for a fix that should take 5 minutes. (and I'm not driving 2 hours to fix something that takes 5 minutes to fix either)
To me, this is the central thrust of the case, so far. Childs may very well be guilty of something, but if he is, I want to be completely sure that his crime is an actual crime, and not a overhyped fabrication. To see a prosecutor pointing to his pack of matches and declaring him an arsonist, so to speak, would do no good for IT in general.
This case will set precedents, if it ever gets to trial. It would be a sad day indeed if network admins could be arrested for using 'no service password-recovery'. Actually, it could get worse -- if his security measures are the very petard that he's hoisted upon, then the ramifications for security professionals everywhere may be severe.
Childs is innocent until proven guilty, and if there is viable, accurate, and non-hyperbolic proof that he intended to cause the failure of the network, then he should be convicted. Just don't send him up for trying to secure it.